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Abstract. The currently dominant approach to the sharing and reuse 
of knowledge strives to develop ontologies, with clearly constrained inter-
pretations. The idea of ontological commitments is based on the knowl-
edge level perspective. Several shortcomings of the knowledge level have 
been identified (Clancey, 1991). Pursuing Clancey's argument, if KBS 
are to be situated in ever changing environments, their purposes and 
significance will change over time and they have to be redescribed ac-
cordingly. The behavior descriptions proposed in this paper emphasize 
coherent and consistent descriptions in some given context, rather than 
predicting performance from knowledge and goals. When systems are 
embedded into larger contexts, their behavior is redescribed so that the 
additional significance is shown. Behavior level descriptions thus pro-
vide the flexibility for conceptual changes in a knowledge-based system. 
We demonstrate how behavior descriptions can be used for documenting 
KBS and present an example of the documentation of a KBS for elevator 
configuration. 
1 Introduction 
It has recently been recognized that the development of large knowledge-based 
systems w h i c h can be successfully used for real wor ld appl icat ions requires the 
shar ing and reuse of knowledge. In the so called knowledge shar ing effort (Neches 
et. a/., 1991)(Swartout, Neches and P a t i l , 1993) a v is ion and corresponding tech-
nologies are be ing developed so that a new system need (and must ) not be 
constructed f r om scratch but can instead be developed by assembling reusable 
components of established knowledge such as ontologies that are already e m -
bodied i n ex is t ing knowledge-based systems ( G u h a and Lenat , 1990; Breuker 
and W i e l i n g a , 1989). O n the basis of shared ontologies, even specific system 
implementat i ons could be reused when b u i l d i n g a new system. 
One m a j o r w o r k i n g group w i t h i n the knowledge shar ing effort (i.e. the Shared , 
Reusable Knowledge Bases group) is concerned w i t h developing a language by 
w h i c h a consensus on vocabulary and semantic interpretat ions of d o m a i n models 
can be establ ished. G r u b e r (1993) has termed the specif ication o f a vocabulary 
for a shared d o m a i n consist ing of definitions of objects, concepts, classes a n d 
relat ions an ontology. Ideally, such shared definitions should be specified at the 
knowledge level (Newel l , 1982), independent of specific representation languages. 
O n the basis of these assumptions an O n t o l i n g u a has been developed. O n t o l i n -
g u a is an implemented system (Gruber , 1993, p. 12-2) for t r a n s l a t i n g ontologies 
f r o m a declarative, predicate-calculus language into a variety of representation 
systems l ike a K L - O N E type system 
S h a r i n g and reusing knowledge which is specified i n some c o m m o n logic that 
is independent of any specific representation language is certa inly of p i v o t a l i m -
portance for developing successful knowledge-based systems. However, C l a n c e y 
has recently po inted out a number of deficiencies of current knowledge level 
specif ications and proposed respective re- interpretat ions (1989). P r i o r to th is 
c r i t i c i s m , Bourne has already argued that the postulate of pure s y m b o l m a -
n i p u l a t i o n processes does not set the right stage for a better unders tanding of 
complex systems. He furthermore proposed behavior descriptions whi ch wou ld 
y i e l d a better understanding of the h u m a n conceptual behavior (Bourne , 1969; 
B o u r n e , E k s t r a n d and D o m i n o s k i , 1971; chapter 1) and whi ch are better sui ted 
for b u i l d i n g large knowledge-based systems. 
A l t h o u g h , proponents of the in f o rmat i on or s y m b o l processing hypothesis 
p r o m p t l y refuted the not ion of behavior descriptions (Newel l , 1969), recent re-
search clearly indicates the value and the promises of behavior descriptions and 
the u n d e r l y i n g scientific i d i o m . Maes (1993) has recently compared knowledge-
based to behavior-based art i f i c ia l intell igence. Behavior -based systems excelled 
i n that such systems can be understood as a part of the environment . T h e i r per-
formance is consequently emerging f rom the interact ion of the system and its en-
v i r onment . T h e y are autonomous open systems and their symbols are grounded 
i n the environment . 
T h e goal of this paper is to provide a f o r m a l i z a t i o n of behavior descriptions 
a n d to show how the shar ing and reuse of knowledge can be accompl ished i n 
a ever changing environment . We w i l l first summar i ze Newel l ' s knowledge level 
conceptual izat ions and point out a number of shortcomings . Whereas k n o w l -
edge level descriptions, which are often viewed as funct ion-structure b luepr ints , 
describe an abstract mechanism, behavior descriptions specify the signif icant 
relat ions among various parameters of behavior . A f ter a general expos i t ion of 
behavior descriptions, i t is exemplif ied how behavior descriptions can be used 
for the documentat ion of art i f i c ia l systems (expert systems and computer pro -
grams i n general) . T h e shar ing and reuse of knowledge is then discussed when 
the funct iona l i ty of a knowledge base is to be extended and when a knowledge 
base is used for purposes, which were not considered at design t i m e . 
2 Newell's knowledge level 
In his in f luent ia l paper, Newel l (1982) has introduced a level of computer sys-
t e m descr ipt ion cal led the "knowledge l eve l " . Since this t ime , descr ibing ar t i f i c ia l 
a n d h u m a n systems as a knowledge system has become an i m p o r t a n t goal i n ex-
pert system research (Clancey, 1985; Breuker and W i e l i n g a , 1989) as wel l as 
i n cognit ive psychology ( P y l y s h y n , 1984; Anderson , 1990). W h e n establ ishing a 
knowledge level descr ipt ion, a n a t u r a l or art i f i c ia l system " i s viewed as h a v i n g 
a b o d y of knowledge and a set of goals, so that i t takes actions i n the env i ron -
ment that its knowledge indicates w i l l a t t a i n its goa ls " (Newel l , 1992, p. 426). 
Knowledge systems are one level i n the hierarchy of systems that make up an 
intel l igent agent. Lower level descriptions such as the s y m b o l level specify how 
a knowledge level system is realized in mechanisms (i.e. in f o rmat i on processing 
and representation) . T h e s y m b o l level is described by a memory , symbols , op-
erations, interpretat ion processes and perceptual and motor interfaces (Newel l , 
1982). T h r o u g h knowledge level descriptions, Newel l has thus provided us w i t h 
a poss ib i l i ty for u n i f o r m l y characteriz ing n a t u r a l and art i f i c ia l systems. 
T h e key assumpt ion under ly ing the knowledge level is the not ion of an idea l -
ized r a t i o n a l agent. A ra t i ona l agent is assumed to have the fo l lowing at tr ibutes : 
1) T h e agent has the a b i l i t y to perform a set o f actions i n some environment . 2) 
T h e agent has goals about how its environment should be. 3) T h e agent has a 
body of knowledge. Its body of knowledge is about the environment , its goals, 
its act ions and the relations between t h e m . T h e agent also knows a l l those facts 
that are a deductive consequence of its body of knowledge 4) T h e pr inc ip le of 
r a t i o n a l i t y is i ts single law of behavior . It describes which actions the agent w i l l 
per form: " I f an agent has knowledge that one of its actions w i l l lead to one of 
its goals, then the agent w i l l select that ac t i on" (Newel l , 1982, p. 102). 
T h e behavior of an agent is a sequence of actions taken i n the environment 
over t i m e . B y a p p l y i n g the pr inc ip le of rat iona l i ty , one can presumably predict 
the future behavior of an agent f rom its knowledge and its goals. Cons ider for 
example a chess player as such an ideal ra t i ona l agent. It has the a b i l i t y to 
per form a set of moves on the chess board . It has the goal of w i n n i n g the game. 
Its body of knowledge consists of the rules of the chess game, i.e. the s t a r t i n g 
posit ions and the legal moves and everything that is deductively derivable f r o m 
this b o d y of knowledge. Therefore, for every chess board constel lat ion, i t knows 
whi ch move w i l l make it w i n the game. W i t h the pr inc ip le of ra t i ona l i ty , i t is 
thus predicted that it w i l l p lay the perfect game of chess. 
T h e assumpt ion of such ideal ized ra t i ona l agents has been shown to produce 
(at least) two substant ia l problems: 1) Impor tant knowledge differences cannot 
be expressed i n a knowledge level descriptions. T h e s y m b o l level must conse-
quent ly be used to denote these i m p o r t a n t d ist inct ions . T h i s is the prob lem of 
confounded knowledge differences. 2) A fa i th fu l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of a knowledge 
level descr ipt ion at the s y m b o l level would often require u n l i m i t e d c o m p u t a t i o n a l 
resources. T h e assumptions made about ra t i ona l agents m a y thus be too unre-
al is t i c for be ing p a r t i c u l a r l y useful. T h i s applies for describing h u m a n cognit ion 
(Anderson , 1990) as wel l as for specifying and i m p l e m e n t i n g knowledge-based 
systems (St i ck len , 1989). T h i s is the prob lem of a too unreal ist ic idea l i sat ion . 
S t i ck len has po inted out the problems of the i n a b i l i t y to represent contro l , the 
po tent ia l c o m p u t a t i o n a l inadequacy and the non-operat ional charac ter i sa t i on 3 . 
3 Schreiber, Akkermans and Wielinga (1990) have rejected these criticisms but we 
believe the case is not yet closed. We propose skills to avoid introducing control into 
knowledge descriptions 
Confounded knowledge differences: Chess grand masters have spent years of 
l earn ing for i m p r o v i n g their chess game. U n l i k e beginners, who merely know the 
rules of the game, chess grand masters are known to have a large vocabu lary of 
different chess board configurations (Chase and S i m o n , 1973). T h e chess grand 
masters thus certa inly have more chess knowledge t h a n the beginners. However, 
i n a knowledge level descr ipt ion a l a Newel l there would be no difference be-
tween the beginner and the chess grand master . Because the beginner s body 
of knowledge wou ld also include everything that is deduct ively derivable f r o m 
the rules of the game, he wou ld be said to know everything a grand master can 
poss ib ly know about chess. In a knowledge level descr ipt ion, a beginner a n d a 
grand master wou ld thus be said to have the same chess knowledge. 
A c c o r d i n g to Newel l (1982, 1992), the s y m b o l level is described w i t h the f o l -
l o w i n g at tr ibutes : 1) a memory , w i t h independently modi f iab le structures that 
conta in symbols ; 2) symbols (patterns in the structures) , p r o v i d i n g the d i s ta l 
access to other structures; 3) operations, t a k i n g s y m b o l structures as i n p u t a n d 
p r o d u c i n g s y m b o l structures as output ; 4) interpretat ions processes, t a k i n g s y m -
b o l structures as input and executing operations (the structures thereby repre-
senting these operations) and 5) Perceptual and motor interface to interact w i t h 
an external environment . A s y m b o l level descript ion of a chess player includes 
its m e m o r y for the different types of chess constel lations. A t the s y m b o l level 
the chess grand master would thus have d r a m a t i c a l l y more chess patterns i n the 
s y m b o l structures (chunks) than the beginner. 
Unrea l i s t i c idea l i sat ion : In order to substantiate the body of knowledge of a 
chess player at the s y m b o l level , one must compute everything that is deduc-
t ive ly derivable f r om the rules of the game. T h i s prob lem is c o m p u t a t i o n a l l y 
intrac tab le . In other words, a c o m p u t a t i o n a l device would be needed that has 
inf inite m e m o r y and inf inite processing resources. Nei ther humans nor computer 
systems can be real is t i ca l ly viewed as such c o m p u t a t i o n a l devices. Knowledge 
level descriptions are therefore unreal ist ic ideal isat ions and not very useful . A 
knowledge engineer, who wants to implement an expert system f rom a knowledge 
level descr ipt ion of the ideal chess player, m a y not even achieve a rude a p p r o x i -
m a t i o n of the program specif ication given at the knowledge level (St i ck len , 1989). 
Since resource l i m i t a t i o n s are a fundamenta l characterist ic of h u m a n cogni t ion 
( M i l l e r , 1956; N o r m a n and Bobrow , 1975; S i m o n , 1974), a psychologist , who 
describes h u m a n behavior at the knowledge level wou ld most frequently derive 
predict ions , for which no suppor t ing e m p i r i c a l evidence can be f ound . 
T h e problems w i t h knowledge level descriptions have been k n o w n for some 
t i m e and various solutions have been proposed (Die t ter i ch , 1986; Schreiber , 
A k k e r m a n s and W i e l i n g a , 1990). These solut ions refine Newel l ' s knowledge level 
no t i on by i m p o s i n g more detai led structures on an agent's body of knowledge. 
T h e y do however not address the root of the prob lem. A l t h o u g h Newel l ' s pro -
posal of descr ibing n a t u r a l and art i f i c ia l systems at a u n i f o r m abstract level is 
extremely i m p o r t a n t for cognit ive psychology and ar t i f i c ia l intel l igence, his for-
m u l a t i o n of the knowledge level hypothesis is incomplete a n d / o r misd irec ted . 
There are four m a j o r misconceptions: 1) Knowledge and goals are i n themselves 
inadequate to fu l ly characterize intel l igent systems. 2) Knowledge level descrip-
t ions are developed as i f intel l igent systems were causal systems. 3) For this 
level of abstract descr ipt ion, the d i s t inc t ion between an agent and its env iron-
ment is ar t i f i c ia l . 4) T h e knowledge level does not lie d irect ly above the s y m b o l 
level a n d there is no t ight connection between t h e m . Therefore knowledge level 
descriptions cannot be reduced to the s y m b o l level (Clancey, 1991). 
3 Behavior descriptions 
If ex i s t ing knowledge level descriptions of systems are inadequate, what then does 
i t take to give an adequate and complete descript ion of intel l igent behavior? 
Knowledge is i m p o r t a n t of course; an intell igent system knows the i m p o r t a n t 
facts of its operative d o m a i n . B u t knowledge alone is inert ; i t does not act on its 
own . There are other equal ly i m p o r t a n t parameters of intel l igent behavior , which 
inc lude , at a m i n i m u m , s k i l l intent ion , (goals or purpose) and performance. T o 
ta lk about the behavior of any agent, n a t u r a l or ar t i f i c ia l , one is obl iged to 
make , either exp l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y , some commitment to the knowledge, s k i l l , 
in tent ion (or goals) and performance of that agent. It is not enough to say that 
the agent has the pertinent knowledge and acts rat ional ly . Such a descr ipt ion is 
at best incomplete , and at worst wrong. 
3.1 E x t e n d i n g knowledge level descriptions 
W h a t do knowledge, intent ion (or goals), s k i l l and performance enta i l and what 
does i t m e a n to ca l l these parameters of behavior? Bas i ca l l y we agree w i t h Newel l 
about the nature of knowledge. T h e knowledge is the complete set of d i s c r i m i -
nat ions , facts, or concepts avai lable to an agent which have been acquired f r om 
past experiences. Knowledge impl ies that the agent can make d ist inct ions be-
tween and a m o n g objects, processes, events and states of affairs. It has a basis 
for t reat ing some things i n one way, others i n a different way. 
B u t , as the foregoing discussion might suggest, knowledge does not exist 
independent ly of, or i n iso lat ion f rom the way it is used. T h u s , w i t h respect to any 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , fact or concept there is a corresponding s k i l l , which represents its 
use. It m i g h t be helpful to th ink of knowledge then, i n R y l e ' s sense, as " k n o w i n g 
that x is the case". S k i l l , then, is " k n o w i n g how to act on that knowledge" 
( R y l e , 1949). T h e difference captured i n this d i s t inc t ion is the difference between 
" k n o w i n g t h a t " and " k n o w i n g how" . A s R y l e (1949, p32) has c learly stated 
k n o w i n g how cannot be defined i n terms of knowing that . 
S i m i l a r l y , intentions or goals do not exist independently of knowledge and 
s k i l l . A n in tent ion is the want , desire or need to act upon some ex is t ing knowledge 
i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. 
T h e combinat ions of knowledge, s k i l l and intent ion do not cause any par -
t i cu lar behavior to be what it is . Neither do they i n any inte l l ig ib le way cause 
an ac t i on . R a t h e r these are merely parameters of a behavior descr ipt ion. B u t to 
use the t e r m " m e r e l y " is not to m i n i m i z e their impor tance . There m i g h t be no 
defensible way to give a va l id causal descript ion of behavior . 
B u t we are not yet f inished. There is a miss ing ingredient . T o provide a c o m -
plete behavior descr ipt ion , it is required that some c o m m i t m e n t be made to the 
knowledge, the s k i l l , and the intent ion of the agent. Knowledge , s k i l l a n d i n t e n -
t ions alone provide on ly a descript ion of behavior potent ia l . W h a t is required to 
complete the descr ipt ion of an ac tua l behavior is some performance or ac t ion by 
the agent. Please note, classical behav ior i sm to the contrary n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , 
performance is not equivalent to behavior i n this descriptive system. It is merely 
a component or parameter of behavior , meet ing the c r i ter ia of consistency a n d 
coherence. R a t h e r t h a n causing performance to be what i t is , knowledge, s k i l l 
a n d in tent ion enable a certain performance i n the sense that they make i t feasi-
ble a n d inte l l ig ib le when it occurs. T h e way we use these concepts entai ls that 
each one of t h e m is involved i n prov id ing a behavior descr ipt ion . 
B = R ( G , K , S , P ) 
where B is behavior , G are the goals or the in tent ion , K is knowledge, S is 
s k i l l , P is performance and R specifies the various re lat ionships a m o n g G , K , S 
and P . 
These components do not exist independently, i n separate systems or i n iso-
l a t i o n . T h e knowledge, the s k i l l , and the intent ion to engage i n any ac t i on , x , are 
t i g h t l y interconnected. For every q u a n t u m of knowledge that al lows for d i s c r i m -
i n a t i o n between x and not -x , there is some way of ac t ing on that d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
a n d some poss ib i l i ty that the actor w i l l want to take that ac t ion . T h u s , i t does 
not make sense to look for independent traces of knowledge, s k i l l and in tent ion 
i n separate b r a i n locat ions of storage mechanisms. 
Cons ider that most adults are able to recognize a case of p iano p l a y i n g when 
they experience i t , even i f they have no mus i ca l t r a i n i n g . I have sufficient k n o w l -
edge to d is t inguish p iano f rom non-piano p l a y i n g i n most c ircumstances (a l -
though there might be cases in which i t would be diff icult for anyone to te l l ) . 
Fur thermore , I have ways of act ing on that knowledge, such as ca l l ing it a case of 
p iano p l a y i n g , or a case of bad p iano p l a y i n g , or s i m p l y leaving the r o o m where 
i t is be ing done. I might have the goal of either approaching , because i t is good 
and I want to hear better, or avo id ing , because i t offends m y sensibi l i t ies . If that 
goal is stronger t h a n a l l other immed ia te goals, I w i l l take the ind i ca ted ac t i on . 
H a v i n g done this , I have completed a behavior episode and anyone ( in c lud ing 
mysel f ) who observed m y act ion and had reason to know or to t h i n k about m y 
personal knowledge, ski l ls and intentions, would be correct i n descr ibing what 
happened as an act of behavior . 
Because I know what qualifies as p iano p l a y i n g , I can consider hypo the t i ca l 
cases of p iano p l a y i n g . T h e fact that I know that I know dist inguishes me , as 
a h u m a n being capable of intel l igent , intent ional ac t ion , f rom an a u t o m a t o n . 
One m i g h t real is t i ca l ly say that the thermostat " k n o w s " how to contro l r o o m 
temperature , by t u r n i n g a switch off and on at appropr iate t imes . B u t i t make 
no sense whatsoever to say that the thermostat " k n o w s that i t knows. " 
T h e concepts of knowledge, s k i l l , intent ion and performance are necessary 
but poss ibly not sufficient to give a complete descript ion of behavior . There are 
other constraints of the system that might have to be taken into account i n 
the general case. For almost a l l purposes of the present discussion, the basic 
parameters w i l l suffice. 
It is t e m p t i n g to l iken the d i s t inc t ion between knowledge and s k i l l i n this 
descriptive system to the concepts of declarative and procedural m e m o r y i n the 
contemporary l i terature of art i f i c ia l intelligence ( W i n o g r a d , 1976) and cognit ive 
psychology (Anderson , 1983; Squire and Slater , 1975; T u l v i n g , 1975). It is c o m -
m o n to invoke R y l e to argue that memories can be either procedural or dec lara-
tive.) Dec larat ive memories are memories for facts, either at a general , concep-
t u a l or semantic level or as episodes, embedded i n some t ime /space co-ordinates. 
M o s t adul t h u m a n beings know, for example , the concept of a newspaper, or a 
m e a l or just i ce . Further they can be expected to know (at least some of) what 
they read i n the newspaper about the U . S. presidential election at home last 
n ight . In the first case, the knowledge is general, semantic and de-contextual ized; 
i n the second case, it is embedded in an episode. In either case, the m e m o r y is 
fact-based, a n d its recollection is always conscious and del iberately achieved 
(note that a s k i l l is required for th is ) . Procedura l memories are memories about 
do ing someth ing . These are the k inds of memories that support acquired s k i l f u l 
performance, as in p iano p l a y i n g , or repet i t ion p r i m i n g effects, of the sort that 
make i t somehow easier to process a s t imulus the second t ime around , or some 
classical c ond i t i on ing phenomena. T h e basis for these m e m o r y effects is noncon-
scious. It does not appear to be necessary for one to know or to be able to say 
m u c h about the s k i l l of p iano p lay ing i n order to p lay the p iano (of course, one 
wou ld surely know that he is p lay ing the p iano , because that ' s a fact) . M o r e -
over, one need not know about or be momentar i l y aware of a pr ior episode w i t h 
a s t i m u l u s i n order to exhib i t (but possibly not experience) a p r i m i n g effect. T o 
make the d i s t inc t i on between declarative and procedural memories complete ly 
clear, some theorists argue that they belong to separate m e m o r y systems and 
never m i x . In some cases, the argument is made that procedural memories derive 
f r om or are some compi led version of fact-based memories . 
W e believe that the dec larat ive /procedura l d i s t inc t ion is i m p o r t a n t , but 
probab ly m u d d l e d i n current theor iz ing . F i r s t of a l l , whi le it is correct to cite 
R y l e i n support of this d i s t inc t i on , it should be noted that he h a d a somewhat 
different m e a n i n g in m i n d . A s in the present system, facts and sk i l l s were not 
independent entities for R y l e . Facts and ski l ls go together. For everyth ing you 
know, there corresponds a way to act upon i t . One does not know a newspaper 
w i t h o u t some related actions (which can, but need not include reading i t ) . There 
is no evidence of declarative memory wi thout associated act ion ; further there is 
no case of intel l igent act ion wi thout a basis i n knowledge. W h i c h is not to say 
that sk i l l s and repet i t ion effects do not exist. It is indeed possible to exh ib i t s k i l l 
w i t h o u t a lot of useful in f o rmat i on you can communicate about i t verbal ly or 
consciously. R e p e t i t i o n p r i m i n g effects are quite rel iable . B u t the fact that you 
appear to be unable to report an earlier occurrence of the pert inent s t imulus 
rules out on ly one possible t h i n g you might know and uses on ly one possible way 
to assess what you know about that s t imulus . There s i m p l y is no c o m p e l l i n g 
evidence at the present t ime that different m e m o r y systems contain declarat ive 
a n d procedura l memories . T h u s , the d i s t inc t i on w i l l require further sharpening 
of b o t h a theoretical and an e m p i r i c a l sort. 
C l a n c e y (1991, p. 386) has already pointed out that knowledge level de-
scr ipt ions should not be identif ied w i t h causal mechanisms because they are 
observer-relative. T h e regularit ies i n the performance of humans or ar t i f i c ia l sys-
tems should be viewed as characterizations that are descriptive. In agreement 
w i t h C lancey ' s arguments , the re lat ionship among the parameters of behavior is 
not causal . T h a t is, the conjunct ion of knowledge and intent ion (or goals) does 
not cause an ac t ion . R a t h e r the relat ionships that governs this descriptive system 
are consistency and coherence. A s we w i l l see, the component parameters must 
make sense together for the behavior described to be accepted as r a t i o n a l . C o m -
ponent inconsistency or incoherence produces descriptions that are i r r a t i o n a l or 
incorrect or unrecognizable as intel l igent behavior . In a more technical no t i on , a 
descr ipt ion of ra t i ona l behavior thus consists of the uni f i cat ion of the parameters 
of behavior . 
T h e environment is as the agent perceives i t . T h a t is , w i t h i n this sys tem, 
there is no po int to the assertion that the environment is one t h i n g a n d the 
o rgan i sm is another. There is no po int i n separat ing interna l f r o m externa l . 
O r g a n i s m s do not jus t funct ion w i t h i n environments , they are part and parcel o f 
the env ironment . A m o n g other things , i t is for that reason that the environment 
is not the same for a l l organisms. N o w of course the environment is not ent irely 
different for different organisms. There are regularit ies , and these regularit ies are 
what gives us some scientific purchase on behavior . 
T h e environment is an interpreted framework w i t h i n wh i ch behavior takes' 
place. T h e environment exists for an agent on ly because the agent has some 
knowledge about what i t perceives, some ski l l s and goals to act on that k n o w l -
edge, and an a b i l i t y to carry forward w i t h act ion or movement . E n v i r o n m e n t s 
differ a m o n g people, because people differ i n wh i ch way they know about what 
they perceive. B u t because to some degree knowledge is shared, environments 
are shared. T o the extent that two people have the same knowledge, sk i l l s , goals 
a n d performance abi l i t ies they w i l l perceive the environment i n the same way 
a n d they w i l l behave i n the same way. T h e i m p l i c a t i o n for knowledge-based 
systems is that we must b u i l d environments into t h e m . T h e knowledge-based 
system must conta in not only knowledge i n some interna l sense (and sk i l l s , goals 
a n d performance abi l i t ies ) , but also knowledge of the environment ( something 
l ike cogni t ion-environment relat ionships i n s tandard termino logy ) i n w h i c h the 
system operates. 
T h e not ion of knowledge has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been used to mediate between the 
in te rna l states of an agent and the states of the w o r l d . B u t there need not be 
any t ight coup l ing between the s y m b o l processing of an art i f i c ia l system a n d i ts 
behavior descr ipt ion . Depend ing upon the scope and context of a behavior de-
s c r ip t i on an ident i ca l s y m b o l processing and performance m a y result i n different 
behavior descriptions. A n d conversely, different s y m b o l processing procedures 
m a y be given an ident ica l behavior descr ipt ion. 
It is often said that science seeks explanat ions for n a t u r a l phenomena. T h e 
s tudy of intel l igent systems (of the empi r i ca l and engineering sciences) is , as i t 
should be, fu l ly as scientific as any of i ts k indred enterprises. Y e t , the system 
we have presented is cal led a descriptive system; its goal is to supply complete 
behavior descriptions. We do not in tend , by the use of this t e r m , to d i m i n i s h i ts 
value as a scientific t oo l . R a t h e r , we are merely fo l lowing the requirements of 
good logic . Log i ca l ly , i t is impossible to exp la in something you cannot i n the first 
place describe to some degree of accuracy and completeness. Because ex is t ing 
systems of descr ipt ion i n psychology and art i f i c ia l intelligence are defective, we 
need to establ ish a descriptive i d i o m that w i l l work. Descr ipt ion must come 
before e x p l a n a t i o n . B u t there is also the poss ib i l i ty that , once an adequate, 
detai led an complete descript ion of behavior has been achieved, there m i g h t be 
n o t h i n g left to e x p l a i n . 
It should be noted that behavior descriptions are not ident ica l to perfor-
mance . Behav io r descriptions encompass the goal , knowledge, s k i l l and perfor-
mance parameters . T h u s , performance is only one of the parameters of behavior 
descriptions. 
3.2 F o r m a l behavior descriptions 
In th is section we describe the f o rmal i za t i on of behavior descriptions. W e then 
show how these descriptions can be used to document c o m p u t a t i o n a l systems. 
D o c u m e n t a t i o n is essential for understanding the operat ion of programs and for 
their maintenance . G o o d documentat ion can a id the reuse of p r o g r a m designs. 
It can also a i d the growth or expansion of the system, and the reuse of p r o g r a m 
design when the purpose, or use-in-practice, of the system changes. T h e prob -
l e m of reusing programs and their designs cannot be solved f r om s y m b o l level 
considerations alone. We must relate s y m b o l level computat ions to abstract level 
descript ions. 
W h i l e we are concerned w i t h K B S i n complex domains we sha l l begin by 
discussing examples i n the field of set theory. T h i s choice was made i n order 
to i l lus trate our ideas clearly, i n a concrete and widely understood d o m a i n . In 
section 4 we address the more complex prob lem of document ing a K B S . 
A behavior descr ipt ion is defined by the 4-tuple < G , K , 5 , P > . One or 
more behavior descriptions m a y be associated w i t h an agent. T h e components 
of the behavior descr ipt ion conform to the fo l lowing specif ication, where each 
descr ipt ion is specified w i t h respect to a par t i cu lar conceptual theory. 
< G , A ' , 5 , P > is a behavior descr ipt ion, i n a conceptual theory C , where: 
G idefines the goal which the behavior descript ion can satisfy, 
the f o r m a l language is predicate calculus (extended as defined below) . 
K idefines knowledge related to the so lut ion of the goal 
the f o r m a l language is predicate calculus. 
S descr ibes ski l l s which per form the c o m p u t a t i o n defined i n K , 
the no ta t i on is that of funct iona l p r o g r a m m i n g . 
P .describes the performance of the sk i l l s , i.e. one or more 
concrete examples of the i n p u t - o u t p u t re lat ion , the f o r m a l 
descr ipt ion is specified by the p r o g r a m m i n g language. 
T h e predicate calculus is extended by the add i t i on of predicates w h i c h repre-
sent concepts i n set theory, for example , set un ion is f ormal ized by: U ( A , B>C). 
However, for c lar i ty , we sha l l use the s tandard inf ix no ta t i on of set theory a n d 
wr i te C = A U B to represent u n i o n . In other domains , predicate calculus m a y 
not be the most appropr iate f o r m a l language. In such cases K and G m a y be 
described i n any suitable f o rmal language which provides appropr iate semantics 
and rules of inference. 
It is required that a funct ion , / i ' , must ac tua l ly exist at the concrete level , i n 
some p r o g r a m m i n g language, before we can conf irm the existence of the s k i l l , h. 
T h i s guarantees that we can o b t a i n examples of ac tua l performances P of the 
sk i l l s . Performances are indexed by the s k i l l they are produced by, the concrete 
level funct ion name, and the p r o g r a m m i n g language the concrete funct ion is 
specified i n . T h i s m e t h o d of documentat ion includes i n f o r m a t i o n whi ch can be 
seen as v a l i d a t i n g the concrete level code. 
T h e relat ionships between the various components of the behavior descr ipt ion 
are i l lus t ra ted by example i n the fo l lowing documentat ions of programs. 
3.3 E x a m p l e 1: Set u n i o n . 
In the framework of s imple set theory the un ion of two sets, A , J9, is a set w h i c h 
contains a l l members of A and a l l members of B. E lements which occur i n b o t h 
A a n d B occur only once i n the un ion set. T h e c o m p u t a t i o n of the union of two 
sets can be considered to be composed of two operations: the construct ion of a 
set C , obta ined f rom B by remov ing a l l elements which also occur i n A, a n d then 
the c o m b i n a t i o n of A and C to y ie ld the output set D. T h e former c o m p u t a t i o n 
we ca l l diff and the latter concatenate. T h e c o m p u t a t i o n is i l lus t ra ted d i a g r a m -
m a t i c a l l y i n figure l 4 , wh i ch shows the re lat ionship between d a t a classes a n d 
sk i l l s . T h e documentat ion of this c o m p u t a t i o n i n terms of behavior descriptions 
is g iven i n table 1. 
T h e goal is a s u m m a r y of the c o m p u t a t i o n , namely that for any sets A a n d 
B the u n i o n , D , can be calculated. T h e knowledge component specifies the d is -
t inct ions which decompose the goal into an equivalent set of formulae , f r o m 
w h i c h the ski l l s can be derived. F o r m u l a i . defines the u n i o n operator i n terms 
of set membership e and i i . defines an equivalent breakdown of the rhs. of i . 
w h i c h introduces the set C i.e. the set whose members are i n B but not i n A. 
T h e s k i l l C = diff(B,A) is associated w i t h the d ist inct ions defined by the expres-
s ion (fcC <-» fcB A / JtA). T h e s k i l l D = concatenate(A.C) is associated w i t h 
(feD <-+ fcA V / e C ) ) , however i n this case the context is i m p o r t a n t as A a n d C 
are guaranteed to be dis jo int . T h i s association is behav iora l , i.e. the s k i l l effects 
This diagram illustrates the method but not the details of the computation. 
F i g . 1. The Union computation (left) and the Intersection computation (right) 
the ca l cu la t i on specified by the knowledge component, as is witnessed by the 
performance. Where i t is possible to prove equivalence between the knowledge 
component a n d the concrete funct ion , this is desirable. However, we acknowledge 
that this m a y not always be possible i n a l l domains . 
L I S P , P R O L O G and C definitions of the diff and concatenate sk i l l s were de-
fined according the decomposit ion defined above. It is notable that the structure 
of the conceptual mode l of the computat i on was m a i n t a i n e d , for imperat ive , 
funct iona l and logic-based p r o g r a m m i n g languages. 
Goal: 
Union (simple set theory) 
Construct D : (VA)(VB)(D = AuB) 
Knowledge: i. (VA)(VB)(VD)(A V B = D) ~ (Ve)(eeA V eeB ~ ecD) 
ii. (Vi4)(V£)(VC)(V0) 
((Ve)(eei4 V ecB ~ ecD)) ~ 
( ( V / ) ( / e C ~ A * A / , M ) A 
(fcD ~ fcA V fcC)) 
Skill: a. C = diff(B,A), D = concatenate(A.C) 
Performance: 1. A = '(1 2 3 4) B = '(4 3 5 6) 
D = '(1 2 3 4 5 6) [skill = a, set-union, LISP] 
2. A = '(a b c) B = <(d e) 
D = '(a b c d e) [skill = a, set-union, LISP] 
Table 1. The behavior description for Union. 
It is also possible to define set un ion as one s k i l l C = union-l(A.B), that is , 
the s k i l l corresponds to the rhs. of i . In this case the funct ion , at the concrete 
level , is a synthesis of the diff and concatenate funct ions. T h e performance of th is 
new concrete level funct ion is not necessarily the same as that defined i n 1. In 
fact , i n the case of L I S P , the performance differs i n the order ing of the elements 
of the ou tput l i s t , D. T h i s difference is not signif icant at the abstract level , i n 
the f ramework of s imple set theory. 
T h e behavior descr ipt ion can therefore document several a l ternat ive so lut ions 
of the goal . T h e descr ipt ion of u n i o n , defined above, can be changed to encompass 
the new s k i l l union-1 and the new performances obta ined f r om the concrete 
imp lementat i ons by add ing the fo l lowing i tems: 
S k i l l : b . D = union-l(A.B) 
Performance : 1. A = ' (a b c) B = ' (d e) 
D = '(c b a d e) [skill = b, un ion -1 , L I S P ] 
3.4 E x a m p l e 2: Set intersect ion. 
T h e intersection of two sets A and B is the set of a l l elements of b o t h A a n d B . 
T h e c o m p u t a t i o n of this set can be viewed as the c o m b i n a t i o n of two steps: the 
ca l cu la t i on of C = B — A and then of D = B — C. T h e set C is composed of those 
elements of B wh i ch are not i n A. T h e goal is to calculate those elements of B 
w h i c h are i n A, and this can be obta ined by remov ing a l l elements of C f r o m B. 
T h e c o m p u t a t i o n is i l lus t rated graphica l ly i n figure 1. T h e behavior descr ipt ion 
of intersection is defined i n table 2. 
Intersection (simple set theory) 
Goal: Construct D : (VA)(VB)(Z> = A D B) 
Knowledge: i. (V;4)(V£)(V0)(i4 D B = D) ~ (Ve)(eeA A ecB ~ ecD) 
ii. (VA)(V£)(VC)(V£) 
((Vc)(ceX A eeB <- etD)) ~ 
( ( V / ) ( / 6 C ~ / e t f A / > M ) A 
(feD~feBVf/tC)) 
Skill: a. C = diff(B,A), D = diff(B,C) 
Performance: 1. A = '(1 2 3 4) B = '(4 3 5 6) 
D = '(4 3) [skill = a, set-intersection, LISP] 
Table 2. The behavior description for intersection 
A s i n the previous case, the knowledge defines an expansion of the goal in to 
a f o r m where sk i l l s can be defined. T h e sk i l l s , or , more precisely, their concrete 
level counterparts , ac tua l ly carry out the c o m p u t a t i o n and the performance is 
recorded. A g a i n , L I S P , P R O L O G and C versions of this c o m p u t a t i o n were de-
fined using the same abstract mode l . 
4 T h e documentation of a configuration system 
For the s imple programs considered so far, i t was possible to give a precise 
def ini t ion of the knowledge of set theory represented i n the programs. In this 
section we show how our approach can be scaled up to describe a conventional 
K B S . W e describe a K B S whi ch solves the Sisyphus task of conf iguring elevator 
systems (Yost , 1992). Due to space considerations we present only a part of the 
entire so lut i on . 
T h e Sisyphus task involves the configuration of elevators according to a given 
design. T h e a i m is to find a configuration which satisfies a number of constraints . 
W e sha l l not describe the der ivat ion of our so lut ion , i n fact we used an approach 
s i m i l a r to the K A D S m e t h o d o l o g y 5 (Breuker and W i e l i n g a , 1989), instead we 
sha l l focus on the documentat ion of the so lut ion . 
F i g . 2. A n inference structure for configuration 
A K B S w i l l t yp i ca l l y be comprised of funct ion definitions which define the 
p r o b l e m so lv ing steps and a knowledge base ( K B ) which defines d o m a i n specific 
i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e funct ion definitions w i l l n o r m a l l y be task specific but d o m a i n 
independent , as w i l l the schema of the K B . O u r so lut ion of the Sisyphus task has 
exact ly this design. It was derived after a knowledge level analysis o f the task was 
per formed. T h e result ing inference structure is shown i n figure 2. T h e m e t h o d 
should be understood as beginning w i t h the selection of a Component f r om the 
Design, de termin ing a number of Parameters which determine the consistency 
of th is choice, and their values. T h e checking of the consistency of the choice of 
component is done by the id-remedy knowledge source which finds a replacement 
component , Remedy, i f any constraints are v io lated . 
5 We adopt the K A D S I terminology 
T h e documentat i on of the K B S must characterise two d is t inct types of k n o w l -
edge: the d o m a i n knowledge of the K B S , and the m e t h o d of the conf igurat ion 
a l g o r i t h m . T h e knowledge about the attr ibutes of a par t i cu lar motor is repre-
sented i n table 3. T h e Knowledge component is a f o r m a l i z a t i o n of the d o m a i n 
knowledge as arguments of the predicates instance-of and has-attribute. These 
predicates have the usual interpretat ion . T h e S k i l l component is the construc-
t i o n of a l ist where slots i n the design are assigned the appropr iate value. There 
is on ly one possible performance, the slots get the correct values. 
T h e conf igurat ion a l g o r i t h m consists of the recursive funct ion configure, w h i c h 
is defined i n terms of two further functions, increment-design and identify-remedy, 
one l ist processing funct ion and functions defined i n the K B . In order to docu -
ment the configure funct ion we must specify the goal which i t satisfies: 
Construct Design — configure (Specification) 
W e consider the knowledge of configure to be a f ormal ized representation of 
the inference structure which resulted f rom the knowledge level analys is . T h e 
meta-classes of the inference structure are captured by predicates whose log ica l 
domains are sets of d o m a i n terms. T h e dependency of meta-classes u p o n one 
another is represented by impl i ca t i ons , and the appropr iate quant i f i cat ion of 
variables . For example , i n our inference structure the knowledge source select 
selects a Component to be configured, given the conf iguration Design. Component 
a n d Design are predicates and the dependency is represented by the formulae : 
i . (Vd : set)(Design(d) —• (3c : element)Component(c)) 
i i . (Vc : element)(Component(c) —* (3d : set)Design(d)) 
F o r m u l a i . states that for a l l designs a component can be selected, i i . states 
that i f a component has been selected then a design must exist . These formulae 
define the key d a t a classes of the d o m a i n and specify a number of consistency 
re lat ionships which must ho ld . E a c h knowledge source of the inference structure 
is described i n a s i m i l a r way and the result ing set of formulae describe a set 
of relations which ho ld i n the inference structure as a w h o l e 6 . T h i s m e t h o d of 
descr ib ing the inference structure does not define how components are selected, 
or when , i n contro l terms, the selection inference is made , these aspects are 
specified i n the S k i l l component . 
T h e S k i l l component is s i m p l y the ordered l i s t ing of the def init ion of con-
figure. Deta i l s such as t e r m i n a t i n g condit ions are o m i t t e d to leave the essential 
s tructure of the a l g o r i t h m . 
This formalization of the knowledge level does not predict the results of the prob-
lem solving, it specifies necessary relationships between K L classes. The role of this 
formalization is descriptive and not predictive or computational. No stronger for-
malization of the K L is possible without introducing domain terms and/or control 
terms. 
Instantiate attributes (elevator configuration) 
Goal: Construct Y : Y = instantiate — attributes (mot or, 10HP) 
Knowledge: i. instance — of(10 H P, motor) 
ii. has - attribute(10HP, model, 10HP) 
iii. has — attribute(10HP, maxHP, 10) 
iv. has — attribute(10HP, maxCurrent, 150) 
v. has — attribute(10HP, weight, 374) 
Skill: a. Y = ( (motor.model 10HP) (motor.maxHP 10) 
(motor.maxCurrent 150) ...) 
Performance: Y = ( (motor.model 10HP), (motor.maxHP 10) 
(motor.maxCurrent 150) ...) 
Table 3. Domain knowledge about the motor model 10HP 
a. < Component, NewDesign> = increment-design(Design, Remedy), 
NewValues = calculate-values(Component,NewDesign), 
NextDesign = join(NewValues,NewDesign), 
NewRemedy = identify-remedy(Component,NextDesign) 
return <0-Design, 0-Remedy> = configure( Next Design, NewRemedy) 
where Design, Remedy are input values, 
and O-Design, O-Remedy are output values 
T h e funct ion increment-design returns a Component and an updated ver-
s ion of the design as the outputs . M o r e details of this funct ion are documented 
i n a separate behavior descript ion which shows that increment-design calls the 
instantiate-attributes funct ion defined above. T h e relat ionship between the S k i l l 
and Knowledge components is indicated by the variable names, i.e. those whi ch 
end i n Design to be interpreted as instances of the Design meta-class. 
T h e Performance component is an example of an execution of the configure 
funct i on . 
1. Design = (... (motor.model nil) ...) 
Remedy = nil 
NextDesign = ( ...(motor.model 10HP) (motor.maxHP 10) ...) 
NewRemedy = 15HP 
O-Design = ( ... (motor.model 15HP) (motor.maxHP 15) ...) 
O-Remedy = nil 
2. Design = (... (motor.model 20HP) ...) 
Remedy = 28 
NextDesign = ( ...(motor.model 20HP) (machine.model 28) ...) 
NewRemedy = nil 
O-Design = ( ... (motor.model 20HP) (machine.model 38) ...) 
O-Remedy = nil 
T h e documentat i on of the K B S differs f r om the documentat ion of the set 
theory programs in that d o m a i n knowledge must be described. T h i s is u n p r o b -
l emat i c . T h e knowledge of the a l g o r i t h m , that is, the knowledge of the so lut i on 
m e t h o d implemented by the a l g o r i t h m , cannot be expressed i n such a way that 
the K L def init ion predicts the s y m b o l level performance. T h i s is a k n o w n feature 
of the knowledge level , the K L cannot be reduced to the s y m b o l level . T h e set 
theory programs are exceptional i n that the s y m b o l level behavior is precisely 
that predicted by the Knowledge component , w i t h i n the phys i ca l l i m i t a t i o n s o f 
the computer which performs the ca l cu lat ion . 
In contrast w i t h the K A D S approach, we have not specified an i m p l e m e n t a -
t i o n where the inference structure is represented as a d ist inct layer of the design. 
Instead, we have produced a design which can be easily related to the inference 
structure and this s impl i f ied the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . T h e documentat i on of our so-
l u t i o n includes examples of runs of the p r o g r a m , hence our approach is more 
e m p i r i c a l t h a n the purely rat ional i s t i c K A D S m e t h o d . 
5 Sharing and reuse 
T h e idea of significance as related to context is i m p o r t a n t i n our approach to 
the reuse of behavior descriptions. Cons ider , for example , that you observe an 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the concatenate funct ion : 
eoneatenate((()(l)(2)(2 1))((3)(3 1)(3 2)(3 2 1))) = 
(()(1)(2)(2 1)(3)(3 1)(3 2)(3 2 1)) 
T h i s funct ion wou ld jus t be described as concatenat ing two sets. However, i f the 
fo l l owing piece of in f o rmat i on is added: 
powerset((2 1)) = (()(1)(2)(2 1)) 
then we can see that the first argument of concatenate is the powerset of the set 
(2 1). I f we now add two more pieces of i n f o r m a t i o n : 
repeated-union((3),(()(l)(2)(2 1)) = ((3)(3 1)(3 2)(3 2 1)) a n d 
*plit((3 2 1)) = <(3). (2 1) > 
we can see that the second argument of concatenate is the l ist formed by a d d i n g 
(3) to the powerset of (2 1) and that these elements were once composed into 
a single l ist (3 2 1). Taken together these functions define an a l g o r i t h m w h i c h 
computes the powerset of a set. T h e significance of the p a r t i c u l a r app l i ca t i on 
of the concatenate funct ion increases as more i n f o r m a t i o n about the context i n 
w h i c h the evaluat ion occurs becomes k n o w n . W e have, of course, on ly described 
the process of understanding the significance of the concatenate funct ion i n one 
p a r t i c u l a r instance, the prob lem of designing a lgor i thms such as powerset is not 
addressed here. 
In general , we view the significance of a c o m p u t a t i o n as increasing as i t 
becomes embedded i n greater and greater contexts, i.e. as the system grows. T h e 
p r o b l e m is to describe and redescribe the c o m p u t a t i o n as this g rowth happens 
i n order that reuse can occur. Behavior descriptions capture the i n f o r m a t i o n 
required for this purpose. 
T h e complete behavior descr ipt ion of the powerset funct ion is shown i n table 
4. T h e c o m p u t a t i o n of this funct ion can be defined recursively as is shown i n 
Powerset (simple set theory) 
Goal: Construct Y : (VA)Y = P(A) 
Knowledge: i. (W1)(VY)(Y = P(A) «- (Vx)(xeY H I C A ) ) 
ii. {\/A)(YY)(Y = P{A) ~ 
(VB)(VC)(VD)(VE)(VF)(C = A- {B}) A (D = P(C))A 
(Vz)(Vy)(zeD A y = {B} U z — A (Y = £ U Z>) 
Skill: a. <B,C> = split(A), D = powerset(C), 
E = repeated-union(B,D), Y = concatenate(D,E) 
Performance: 1. A = \2 1), Y = <(()(1)(2)(2 1)) [skiU = a, powerset, LISP] 
2. A = '(3 2 1) 
' Y ='(()(1)(2)(2 1)(3)(3 1)(3 2)(3 2 1)) 
[skill = a, powerset, LISP] 
Table 4. The behavior description of powerset. 
figure 3. T h e powerset Y , of set A , is the set of a l l subsets of A. T h e basic insight 
required to derive the c o m p u t a t i o n a l method f rom the requirements is to note 
that the powerset of a set A can be calculated f r om the powerset of A m i n u s 
element B a n d the set formed by add ing B to every subset of D. 
T h e m e t h o d is to spl i t one element, 5 , of the input set A> to o b t a i n set C. 
T h e powerset, D, of C is calculated and then the set E is created by a d d i n g B 
to each member o f D. T h e un ion of D and E y ields the powerset o f A. In fact , 
as D a n d E are dis joint (there are no members of B i n D ) , the powerset can be 
obta ined by the concatenation of D and E. T h i s is documented i n table 4. 
F i g . 3. The powerset computation. 
6 Conclusions 
W e have defined behavior descriptions i n order to overcome a number of p rob -
lems w i t h fixed ontologies. W e have shown how behavior descriptions can be 
f o rmal i zed and i l lus trated our proposals by a number of s imple examples f r o m 
set theory. T h e documentat ion of a knowledge-based system for the S isyphus 
task demonstrates how our approach can be scaled up . 
T h e knowledge level is a ra t i ona l approach for describing the behavior of a 
c o m p u t a t i o n a l system. In a d d i t i o n to this descriptive func t i on , the knowledge 
level is also used i n the development of K B S . T y p i c a l l y , dec larat ive ly represented 
knowledge plays a specific role i n a prob lem so lv ing m o d e l , however, the doc-
u m e n t a t i o n of such a system relies on a fixed interpretat ion . In contrast , our 
approach is more evo lut ionary ( K u h n , 1993) ( H i n k e l m a n n , Meyer a n d S c h m a l -
hofer, 1994). Behav ior descriptions m a y change over t ime . 
W e do not separate the descr ipt ion of the requirements f r om the descr ipt ion of 
the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n (Swartout and Balzer , 1982) and the system is not viewed as 
be ing divorced f r om the environment i n which i t is used. In compar ison w i t h the 
discussion of the knowledge l e v e l / s y m b o l level re lat ionship i n S m i t h and J o h n s o n 
(1993) we emphasise the not ion of method i n the knowledge level descr ipt ion . 
F r o m C lancey ' s discussion of the frame of reference p r o b l e m we can conclude 
that there m a y be different descriptions for the same system depending u p o n 
context . P u r s u i n g this argument , we consider it inevi table that systems w i l l be 
redescribed for different contexts and purposes. T h i s contrasts w i t h the v iew of a 
fixed ontology based upon a un i f o rm K L descriptions. For a l l owing such concep-
t u a l changes on K B S and programs, we proposed the behavior descriptions and 
prov ided a f o rmal i za t i on which can be used for documentat i on . Such documen-
t a t i o n consists of, 1) the goal or purpose the K B S is used for, 2) the d is t inct ions 
a n d categorizations which are made by the system, i.e. representation of declar-
at ive knowledge, 3) the c o m p u t a t i o n a l procedures which are implemented by 
the system and correspond to the categorization made by the encoded declar-
at ive knowledge and 4) the ac tua l ly observed i n p u t - o u t p u t relat ions (i.e. the 
performance of the system on selected test cases). 
If the use of a system is not to be l i m i t e d by the designer's preconceptions, 
then the abstract descriptions of a system have to be changed according to the 
new purposes which users m a y invent. W e have shown how behavior descriptions 
are adjusted to new purposes by assessing the already ex is t ing behavior descrip-
t i o n i n the l ight of the newly emerging conceptual izat ion . It is often assumed 
that knowledge shar ing and reuse is to be accompl ished by speci fying a (rather) 
fixed ontology, which is agreed upon by a l l designers and users. T h e proposed 
behavior descriptions provide the flexibility of describing and redescribing sys-
tems according to the current purposes. Behav ior descriptions thus a l low for the 
shar ing and reuse of knowledge as wel l as for conceptual changes over t i m e ( K e i l , 
1993; R a m , 1993). Specific representation languages m a y be required for f o r m i n g 
such descriptions. A declarative language which allows for knowledge evo lut ion 
is current ly being developed i n the V E G A project (Boley, 1993). 
W e view reuse as a prob lem of the redescription of c o m p u t a t i o n a l systems i n 
larger contexts. Components of a system ga in significance by being embedded. 
A n example of such an embedding is the reuse of the concatenate funct ion w i t h i n 
the powerset funct ion . A n o t h e r example is the reuse of calculat ions i n a spread-
sheet env ironment by embedding t h e m i n a larger workflow e.g. for p a y i n g trave l 
expenses (see for example , Da l lemagne et. a/., 1992). W e have not yet presented 
a technology for reuse, but we have l a i d some of the theoretical groundwork for 
such a technology. 
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